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Abstract
We show existing studies use instruments that violate the monotonicity assumption
needed for identication of a Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE) of school entry
age. We propose an instrument satisfying this requirement and nd no e¤ect of entry age
on the educational attainment of children born in the fourth quarter. We then estimate
a model reconciling di¤erent IV estimates. We show one standard instrument is badly
biased but that the other primarily captures a di¤erent LATE. We provide suggestive
evidence that a waiver policy allowing some children to enter before the legalage could
increase average educational attainment.
1 Introduction
Over the last four decades many states and school districts have increased the minimum
age at which children may enter kindergarten. In the 1960s children frequently entered
kindergarten when they were considerably less than ve years old (or, more commonly, rst
grade when they were less than six years old). This was formally permitted in many states
whereas, in other states, it was relatively easy to get around the rules. Today, thirty-eight
states have cuto¤ dates requiring children entering kindergarten to be ve years old before
October 16 of the year in which they enter kindergarten, and some of the remaining states
have districts that apply a stricter standard.
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Whether delayed entry improves or worsens education outcomes is controversial. Many
recent studies in both education and economics have been devoted to obtaining consistent
estimates of the e¤ects of school entry age on short run and long run outcomes. Angrist and
Krueger (1992) address the potential endogeneity of entry age by using quarter of birth as
an instrument for entry age. They (Angrist and Krueger, 1991) show that historically indi-
viduals born in the rst quarter started school later than those born in the fourth quarter,
completed less education and earned less than those born in the rest of the year.1 Critics
of this approach argue that quarter of birth may be directly related to student outcomes
or parental socioeconomic status.2 Buckles and Hungerman (2013) provide evidence that
children born at di¤erent times in the year are conceived by women with di¤erent socioeco-
nomic characteristics. To address this issue, several researchers have exploited the variation
in state laws governing entry age (henceforth, called legal entry age) to identify its e¤ect
on test scores, wages, educational attainment and other outcomes.3 However, since entry
age depends on both state law and date of birth, the potential endogeneity of date of birth
remains problematic for this approach.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we address the monotonicity requirement for
the estimation of a Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE).4 We argue that both stan-
dard instruments, quarter of birth and legal entry age, may provide inconsistent estimates
of LATE because they violate monotonicity.5 Therefore, we propose an instrument that
satises monotonicity and gives consistent estimates of the LATE of school entry age on
educational attainment. Our binary instrument equals one if the individual was required
by state law to delay kindergarten entry and zero otherwise. We control for quarter of
birth in all specictions. In this setting, LATE implies that we identify the policy relevant
parameter, i.e. the e¤ect on those individuals who delay enrollment only because they are
constrained by the law. Our two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) results, consistent
with Angrist and Krueger, show a large negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational
attainment when the IV is quarter of birth. Using the legal entry age instrument yields a
smaller but still substantial adverse e¤ect though it falls short of statistical signicance at
conventional levels. Finally, when we use the consistent estimator that meets the monotonic-
1See also Mayer and Knutson, 1999 and Cahan and Cohen, 1989.
2Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; Bound and Jaeger, 2000.
3Allen and Barnsley, 1993; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Datar, 2005; Dobkin and
Ferreira, 2010; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Fertig and Kluve, 2005; Fredriksson and Ockert, 2013; Puhani
and Weber, 2007.
4 Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) show that
with heterogeneous treatment e¤ects, under certain conditions, IV identies theLATE. One condition, termed
monotonicity,generally treated as an unimportant regularity condition, requires that while the instrument
may have no e¤ect on some individuals, all of those who are a¤ected should be a¤ected unidirectionally.
5As we discuss in some detail later, depending on the size of the band around the discontinuity, similar
concerns may arise for analyses based on regression discontinuity.
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ity requirement, the e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment is very close to
zero.
Comparing the di¤erent IV estimates does not tell us whether they diverge because the
traditional estimators are inconsistent or because they are measuring di¤erent LATEs. A
second aim of this paper is to address this issue and to reconcile the di¤erent IV estimates
including ours. To achieve this, we develop a simple framework of school entry and educa-
tional attainment and use indirect inference to estimate the parameters of the model. We
then simulate our model to compare the IV estimates with their respective LATEs. Quarter
of birth proves to be robust to the failure of monotonicity but legal entry age does not.
Third, we are interested in the broader question of the optimal age at which to start
school and, in particular, optimal policy regarding school entry age. Legislation, such as
the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act of 2001, has put great pressure on schools to improve
student performance on tests. Some states have responded by raising the school entry age
(Deming and Dynarski, 2008; Stipek, 2006). Given the historical nature of our data, the
IV approach captures the e¤ect of delaying school entry as it was practiced in the 1950s.
But school entry age laws are now enforced much more strictly. Thus, we conduct a policy
experiment using simulated data to study the e¤ect of having strict entry age rules (the
current practice) on average educational attainment. We show that the entry age that
maximizes a childs eventual educational attainment varies considerably from about age 4.5
years to well over seven. The policy experiment suggests that, in an environment where
laws are strictly enforced, constraining fourth quarter children to enter late reduces average
educational attainment. Taken together, the results imply that having a waiver policy that
gives constrained children the choice to enter earlier than the legally established age could
increase educational attainment, particularly among groups that have high dropout rates.
The next section explores the literature on school entry age. Section 3 outlines the
TS2SLS methods that we use for our baseline model. Section 4 describes the data. We
present the TS2SLS results in section 5. Section 6 builds and estimates a model of school
entry age and we use this model to evaluate di¤erent IV estimators found in the literature.
In section 7, we use the model to conduct policy experiments to understand the e¤ect of
di¤erent policy regimes on educational attainment. Section 8 concludes.
2 School Entry Age: Background
2.1 Literature
There has been a recent explosion of interest in school entry age that makes it di¢ cult
to treat the literature with justice. Until the 1990s, studies that looked at the e¤ect of
school entry age on student outcomes largely ignored the potential endogeneity of entry age.
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However, a­ uent parents can a¤ord child-care costs associated with delaying their childs
school entry and are therefore more likely to do so. Thus, there is a positive association
between parental socioeconomic conditions and entry age that can bias the OLS estimate
towards a positive e¤ect of entry age on academic outcomes. On the other hand, the
OLS estimate could be downward biased if children who are less precocious intellectually
and/or emotionally are redshirted6 since these children are more likely to perform poorly
on cognitive tests
Angrist and Krueger (1992) address endogeneity by using quarter or month of birth as
an instrument for entry age. More recent papers (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Datar, 2005;
Elder and Lubotsky, 2009) have used legal entry age as an instrument. This approach
instruments actual entry age with the age at which the child could rst legally enter school.
It thus relies on both variation in state (or country) laws and month of birth.
Although somewhat mixed, the evidence from this literature suggests that older entrants
have higher test scores compared to early entrants in the same grade and are less likely to
repeat grades. However, the test score di¤erences fade by the time the child is in middle
school. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2011), using data from Norway, nd a small benecial
e¤ect of early entry on cognitive score at age 18. Comparing younger children of the same
age, Barua and Lang (2008) nd that early entrants perform better on achievement tests,
presumably because they have completed more schooling relative to those who began school
late.
Therefore it is important to determine whether entry age a¤ects ultimate educational
attainment. If late entry reduces grade retention, has no negative e¤ect on performance
within grade and has no adverse e¤ect on ultimate grade completion, then later entry
produces the same outcome at lower cost to the public (although parents pay more for
child-care and their children enter the labor market later). However, if later entry is not
o¤set by later exit, those who enter late leave school with less education and fewer skills
than earlier entrants leaving at that age. In this case, delaying entry reduces human capital
accumulation.
The literature on the e¤ect of entry age on educational attainment provides mixed
results. For the U.S., Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Dobkin and Ferreira (2007) nd that
older entrants attain slightly less education and Deming and Dynarski (2008) attribute
much of the decline in educational attainment to the trend towards later school entry, but
Bedard and Dhuey (2012) nd no e¤ect. Outside the US, some studies nd a negative
impact of early school entry on adult educational attainment and other outcomes (Allen
and Barnsley, 1993; Fredriksson and Ockert, 2013) while others nd positive or no e¤ects
6 In this context, redshirting refers to the practice of postponing entrance into kindergarten of age-eligible
children in order to allow extra time for socioemotional, intellectual, or physical growth.
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(Fertig and Kluve, 2005; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2011).7 However, as discussed in
the next sub-section, there are important issues with the identication strategies used in
the existing literature that needs further attention.
2.2 Specication Issues
Historically, economists assumed that instrumental variables estimates captured a single
coe¢ cient, the common e¤ect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. Lang
(1993) criticized the use of quarter of birth as an instrument for education in Angrist
and Krueger (1991). He argued that the relation between log wage and education was
inherently nonlinear and that the standard log wage equation should be viewed as a linear
approximation in which the coe¢ cient on schooling is random. He further argued that the
Angrist/Krueger estimate of the return to schooling could be a severely biased estimate of
the average of this random coe¢ cient (now termed the Average Treatment E¤ect) because
the justication for their instrument implies that it estimates the returns to education only
for those with relatively little education.
Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that in a random coe¢ cients model (i.e. one with het-
erogeneous treatment e¤ects), under certain conditions, instrumental variables can still be
interpreted as a Local Average Treatment E¤ect. LATE is the average e¤ect of a treatment
on those individuals whose treatment status is changed by the instrument. With a binary
treatment, these are the complierswho receive the treatment when the instrument applies
but not otherwise.8 With a multi-valued treatment, these are the individuals who increase
the intensity of their treatment, and the estimated LATE gives more weight to individuals
with larger responses to the instrument (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).
One of the assumptions for the identication of LATE is monotonicity: while the in-
strument may have no e¤ect on some individuals, all of those who are a¤ected must be
a¤ected in the same direction. Both the quarter of birth instrument and the legal entry age
instrument violate the monotonicity assumption. Many parents do not enroll their children
at the earliest permissible entry age (and some nd ways to enroll them earlier than is for-
mally allowed). Such strategic behavior is more common among parents of children born in
7Consistent with nding no e¤ect on educational attainment, Black, Devereux and Salvanes nd a pos-
itive e¤ect of early entry on earnings for younger workers, presumably because they have more experience.
However Bedard and Dhuey nd an adverse e¤ect on earnings in the United States.
8Note that the terminology introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994), although more familiar to empirical
economists, is not helpful in this setting and should be replaced by monotonicity (Angrist and Imbens, 1995)
or uniformity (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006). The treateddo not have the option of entering at the
same age as the controls.Thus the concepts of always takersand never takersdo not apply. Moreover,
in our example, neither those who enter at age ve nor those who enter at age six are complying with or
defying the intended treatment. Instead, we say that date of birth does not have a monotonic or uniform
e¤ect on entry age, and its failure to do so can make instrumental variables estimates that rely on birth date
inconsistent.
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the latter half of the year (West, Meek and Hurst, 2000). Thus almost all students born in
May enter kindergarten in September following their fth birthday (or rst grade following
their sixth birthday). In contrast, some children born in October will enter before their
fth birthday, when they are younger than those born in May, while others will enter the
following year when they are older than entrants born in May. Therefore quarter of birth
is not monotonically related to school entry age and any instrument that uses variation in
month or quarter of birth will violate monotonicity.
The monotonicity assumption is not directly veriable since it involves counterfactuals.
However, one can compare the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of entry age for
those born in the rst and fourth quarters to test for stochastic dominance. A necessary
but not su¢ cient condition for monotonicity is that the CDF of entry age for those born in
quarter of birth 1 and the CDF of entry age for those born in quarter of birth 4 should not
cross.9
Figure 1 shows this for those born in the rst and last quarters of 1952 using reported
age and grade at the time of the 1960 census.10 We can see that neither distribution of
entry age is greater than the other in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. Being
born in the rst quarter rather than the fourth quarter raises entry age for some children
9See proof of this proposition in Angrist and Imbens (1995)
10The ages refer to the year before rst grade for those who do not attend kindergarten. Equivalently,
we assume that students who enter school in rst grade would have spent one year in kindergarten had
they enrolled. The dating of kindergarten entry is imperfect because we do not have data on retention or
acceleration. Very late entry is assumed to reect retention and categorized as 5.75 - 6.5 depending on the
quarter of entry. Similarly, very early entry is assumed to reect acceleration and is categorized as 3.75 -
4.5.
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and lowers it for others. Formal statistical tests conrm the visual result, and we can reject
the null hypothesis that either distribution stochastically dominates the other. The cdf of
the rst quarter distribution lies above that of the fourth quarter (9% compared with 6%)
in the range of entry age [4:5; 4:75) and again at [5:5; 5:75) (i.e. 87% compared with 55%).
The probability of either deviation happening by chance is extremely low.11
Although neither quarter of birth nor legal entry age satises monotonicity, it is possible
to nd an instrument that does. Figure 2 shows the distribution of entry age for children
born in the fourth quarter in states that permit them to enter school in the year in which
they turn ve (unconstrained states) and in states that formally restrict them to enter
only in the year in which they turn six (constrained states). We can see that rst-order
stochastic dominance is satised: children born in the fourth quarter in constrained states
enter school later than those in unconstrained states. We note that rst-order stochastic
dominance is only a necessary, not a su¢ cient, condition for monotonicity and only one of
several requirements for consistency.12
In the next two sections we compare IV estimates of the e¤ect of school entry on educa-
tional attainment for di¤erent choices of instrument. We use the argument above to propose
an instrument that satises monotonicity and identies a policy relevant parameter.
11We are grateful to Garry Barrett for conrming this assessment using McFaddens (1989) test of rst
order stochastic dominance as corrected by Barrett and Donald (2003).
12As discussed in detail in Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006), an additional variable inuencing entry
age but not included in the estimation could be correlated with the state law and lead to a violation of
monotonicity. The IV estimate would provide an inconsistent estimate of LATE even though the usual
requirements for IV are satised, for example, if states permitting early entry age also tended to be states
with inexpensive childcare. Some parents may delay entry and take advantage of the inexpensive childcare
in an early entry age state but they succeed in entering their child early in a state with a stricter cuto¤. If
this e¤ect were modest, stochastic dominance could be satised even though monotonicity is not.
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3 Methods: Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS)
We estimate the following equation for educational attainment:
Ai = Di +X
0
i +
4X
j=2
Qijj + Si + i (1)
where, Ai is the educational attainment of individual i. Di is the dummy endogenous
variable that takes on the value of 1 if individual i0s school entry is delayed from the year
in which he turns ve to the year in which he turns six. Qij is a set of three dummy
variables (j = 2; 3; 4) indicating the quarter of birth of the ith individual. Xi is a vector
of observable individual characteristics that include age, race and sex. Si denotes state
dummy variables. Since OLS estimates of  in the above model might be biased by the
decision of some parents to accelerate or redshirt their children, we estimate a 2SLS model
based on the following rst stage equation:
Di = Zi +X
0
i+
4X
j=2
Qijj + 'Si + i: (2)
The binary instrument Zi equals one if the individual was required by state law to delay
kindergarten entry. In other words if the childs month of birth is later than the state
kindergarten entry age cuto¤ date, Zi equals one and equals zero otherwise.
In this setting, LATE implies that we identify the policy relevant parameter, i.e. the
e¤ect on those individuals who delay enrollment only because they are constrained by the law.
In contrast, it is unclear what the policy relevance of the LATE estimates using quarter of
birthand legal entry ageinstruments would be even if they were consistent. If the law
were uniform and strictly enforced and therefore monotonicity satised, the born in rst
quarterinstrument could only hope to identify the e¤ect of entering school when roughly
six months older (on average) than those born in the other three quarters. If the e¤ect of
entry age is non-linear, the e¤ect of an average six-month di¤erence in entry may be very
uninformative about the e¤ect of entering a full year earlier. For similar reasons, the entry
age e¤ect derived from regression discontinuity designs, even when consistent, is often of
little policy interest.
Assessing the LATE measured when we use legal entry age as an instrument is more
complex but similar. For example, suppose that we use legal entry age as an instrument
in a country in which everyone enters exactly at the legally permitted age. In this case,
monotonicity is satised. Moreover OLS and IV are identical, which simplies the analysis.
The LATE estimator in this case is a least squares approximation of the e¤ect of entering
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school when one day older. It is therefore a measure of the e¤ect of moving the rst day
of school one day later if nothing else changed. However, for the most part, moving the
rst day of school from early September to early October in order to raise the school entry
age is not part of the policy discussion. What is under discussion is whether to change the
minimum entry age.
To our knowledge, there is no large nationally representative data set with information
on school entry age, educational attainment and quarter of birth. To circumvent the lack of
data, we use the Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Square (TS2SLS) procedure developed by
Angrist and Krueger (1992,1995). TS2SLS requires that we have data on the endogenous
variable (Di) and the instrument, Zi, for a cohort in one data set and the outcome of interest
(Ai) and Zi of the same cohort in another data set. We combine data from the 1960 and
1980 US census for individuals born in the US between 1949 and 1953. We obtain rst stage
coe¢ cients from the 1960 census and use them to predict entry age of the contemporaneous
1980 census respondents. Instrumental variable estimates are generated by regressing 1980
educational outcomes on the cross-sample tted value of their entry age.13 The standard
errors are then adjusted to account for the use of a predicted value in the second stage.
The appendix gives a detailed description of the method used to consistently estimate the
correct asymptotic covariance matrix for TS2SLS with Moulton clustered standard errors.14
Since we control for quarter of birth (and state), the instrument has a monotonic e¤ect
on school entry age. The monotonicity assumption would be violated if there were deers.
In other words, if some children born in the fourth quarter enter school early only when
they are prohibited from doing so. Although we cannot directly test for such violations, we
nd them implausible.
Our identication strategy requires that the school entry cuto¤ date has no e¤ect on
either the entry age or the educational outcomes of children born in the rst three quarters.
This condition would be violated if parents do not want their child to be the youngest in
class. Therefore, they may decide not to redshirt a child born in September in a state
with a late cuto¤ (e.g. January 1), but decide to redshirt in a state with an early cuto¤
(e.g., October 1). In this scenario, school entry age laws would a¤ect the entrance age of
those children who are not directly constrained by the law (i.e. those born in the rst three
quarters). Such externality e¤ects would be a threat to our identication strategy.
Table 1 provides some evidence that this no externality condition is satised and
13 Inoue and Solon (2006) call this the two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) estimator. They note
that in nite samples, the TSIV estimator originally proposed by Angrist and Krueger and the TS2SLS
estimator typically used by practitioners are numerically distinct. In addition, they show that the TS2SLS
estimator is asymptotically more e¢ cient.
14Note that the treatment varies at the state/quarter of birth level and that it is therefore important to
cluster the standard errors at this level.
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school entry age laws are not a¤ecting entrance age of unconstrained children.15 Using
the 1960 census, we show the average entry age by quarter of birth of individuals born
between 1949-1953 in two types of states. As this table illustrates, the average school entry
age of individuals born in the rst three quarters does not vary much by whether they are
in a fourth quarter constrained state or not. In other words, raising the minimum entry
age does not a¤ect redshirting among those not constrained by the law. In contrast, the
distribution of entry age for the fourth quarter di¤ers noticeably between the two types
of states. Interestingly, increasing the minimum entry age, by constraining those born in
the fourth quarter to enter late, appears not only to reduce the proportion of children
entering at very young ages but also appears to increase the proportion entering even later
than required by the law. This does not a¤ect the consistency of the IV estimator but
does suggest that the mechanism, and therefore the LATE, is more complex than simply
constraining some children who would not otherwise be constrained.16
Our instrument would be invalid if it a¤ected the educational attainment of individuals
born in the rst three quarters. This would be the case if the age of the other children
in the classroom a¤ected the educational attainment of children not directly a¤ected by
the law. To test whether entry laws are independent of other factors a¤ecting educational
attainment, we regress educational attainment for children born in the rst three quarters on
a quadratic function of state cuto¤ dates controlling for gender, race, age and age squared
(not including 3rd quarter births in states with September cuto¤s, for which we cannot
determine the legal entry age). The main explanatory variable is measured in units of the
number of days till the state cuto¤ date. For example, the cuto¤ date for a December 31st
or January 1st would be equal to 365. Similarly, September 1st would be 244 days and so
on.
In essence this asks whether children una¤ected by the cuto¤s get more or less education
in states with later cuto¤s. Such a relation could arise even without an externality if the
cuto¤ were endogenous to education levels, and it is for this reason that our principal
estimates control for state. The rst column of table 2 reports regression results from a
model that includes eight census region dummies as additional controls. The second column
includes two quarter of birth dummies as additional control variables. The coe¢ cients are
small and statistically insignicant in both columns the F-statistic for cuto¤ & cuto¤
15Angrist and Krueger (1992, table 2) shows mean di¤erences in entry age by cuto¤ age. The pattern of
di¤erences implied by our table 2 are similar to theirs although we tend to nd larger entry age di¤erences
across quarters of birth, possibly because we choose a narrower age range less subject to the e¤ects of grade
retention. They do not address whether the pattern of entry age in the rst three quarters di¤ers by cuto¤
date.
16 It is important to note that in the 1960s there is signicant noncompliance, especially among fourth
quarter children, in both types of states. In states with a 10/1 or 9/30 cuto¤, about 45% of fourth quarter
individuals enter school even before they are allowed to enter. On the other hand, in states which allow
fourth quarter children to enter early, about 25% redshirt.
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Entry Age by Quarter of Birth 10/1 or 9/30 cutoff 1/1 or 12/31 cutoff
First Quarter 23.97 24.75
4.5 11.4 10.99
5.5 73.44 72.99
6.5 11.83 12.08
7.5 3.33 3.46
Second Quarter 23.84 23.04
4.25 7.42 7.45
5.25 75.94 73.02
6.25 12.82 15.08
7.25 3.82 4.44
Third Quarter 26.92 26.81
4 7.28 6.76
5 72.97 73.57
6 15.77 14.9
7 3.98 4.77
Fourth Quarter 25.26 25.40
3.75 4.76 7.64
4.75 40.57 67.21
5.75 42.61 19.72
6.75 12.06 5.43
Entry age is rounded off to the earliest reasonable age if actual entry age was either too young or
too old
Table 1: Distribution of Entry Age by Quarter of Birth (1960 census, 1949-1953 cohorts)
squared?. The results suggest that the cuto¤ does not a¤ect the outcomes of those it does
not directly constrain and also that the cuto¤ is exogenous to education levels.
Table 2: Effect of Cutoff Date on Educational Attainment (First Three Quarters Only)
(1) (2)
Cutoff Date in Days -0.0087 -0.0109
(0.0099) (0.0098)
Cutoff Date Squared 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
White 0.8299 0.8298
(0.0463) (0.0462)
Age in Quarters 0.0816 0.0832
(0.0126) (0.0127)
Age Squared -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Sex 0.2435 0.2435
(0.0208) (0.0208)
Observations 301453 301453
R-squared 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered by state/quarter of birth
Excludes Individuals born in the third quarter in States with September Cut-off
Column (1) also includes census region dummies while the second column additionally includes
two quarter of birth dummies
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Admittedly, there could be e¤ects on fourth quarter who would have chosen to
delay entry even in the absence of the legal constraint. But most, if not all,
of the mechanism by which this would take place would be expected to a¤ect
children born in the rst three quarters as well.
It is possible that the cuto¤ date is endogenous to the relative performance of students
born in di¤erent quarters. For example, one might argue that states in which children born
in the fourth quarter do well in school adopt a December 31 cuto¤. On the other hand, states
where their performance is relatively weak adopt an earlier cuto¤. If this is true, we would
be subject to a critique similar to the Buckles and Hungerman (2013) critique of the quarter
of birth instrument. They nd that weather has a greater e¤ect on births to disadvantaged
mothers. Thus if the weather produced more (disproportionately disadvantaged) births in
the fourth quarter in some states and those states had earlier cuto¤s, our instrument might
be invalid. However, table 1 also shows that the seasonality of births is similar in states
with a third and fourth quarter cuto¤. We cannot reject that seasonality of birth in this
table is independent of state cuto¤s (2(3) = 4:57).
It is also important to determine whether the di¤erence between the demo-
graphic characteristics of mothers of fourth-quarter and other children di¤ers
between states that restrict entry of the former and those whose do not. This
addresses two possible concerns. First, it casts further light on the seasonality
issue by allowing seasonality to have a di¤erent relation to mothers character-
istics in the two types of states. Second, it helps to address concerns about
endogenous mobility. For example, if pushy mothers of fourth quarter children
choose to relocate to states that permit earlier entry, we should see a relation
between maternal characteristics and state laws. Therefore, in Table 3, we
regress maternal characteristic (educational attainment, marital status, black
dummy, maternal age when the child was born) on the instrument controlling
for state xed e¤ects and quarter of birth, using the children from the 1960
census.17 In none of the equations is the coe¢ cient on delayed by law sig-
nicant at the .05 level although this coe¢ cient is signicant at the .1-level
in one out of the four cases, a fairly high probability event. Three of the four
point estimates (in the maternal education,race and age equations) suggest that
children born in the fourth quarter in constrained states may be slightly more
disadvantaged relative to those born in the other quarters, while one (single
motherhood) points in the oppositie direction. Taken together, these results
support the view that there are no large di¤erences between fourth quarter
and other children in states with di¤erent cuto¤s.
17About four percent of children did not have information on maternal characteristics.
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Table 3: Effect of Being Born After the Cutoff on Maternal Characteristics: 1960 census
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mothers Education Single Mother Black Mother
Mothers Age at
Birth of Child
Delayed By Law -0.089 -0.003 0.014* -0.050
(0.059) (0.005) (0.007) (0.131)
Observations 92893 92893 92893 92893
R-squared 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.01
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors clustered by state/quarter of birth
All estimates also control for state fixed effects and three quarter of Birth Dummies
Finally, since we cannot be sure which laws applied to children who moved
between birth and when we observe them, in both data sets, we restrict the
sample to individuals whose state of birth and current residence were identical.
Our results are nevertheless robust to merging laws by state of birth alone,
which also suggests that endogenous mobility is not a signicant concern.
4 Data
The data on school entry age come from the one percent sample of the 1960 US Census
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). We use the 1980 U.S. PUMS ve percent sample
to measure educational attainment. Both samples have information on quarter of birth.
The main endogenous variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
delayed school enrollment from the year he turned 5 to the year he turned 6 or later. Age
in quarters was computed as of census day (April 1, 1960) using information on quarter of
birth. The census, however, does not collect school entry age information. School entry
age can still be computed using highest grade completed if we assume that no one repeats
or skips a grade. We do not know whether children attended kindergarten or entered rst
grade directly as was common during this period. We treat all individuals as having spent a
year in kindergarten. Thus someone who rst enrolled in school as a rst-grader at exactly
the age of 6 would be counted as having entered school at exactly age 5. Based on this
assumption, we computed the school starting date for individuals born in the US between
1949 and 1953. We note that the focus on kindergarten entry age is somewhat anachronistic.
In the 1950s, many children entered school in rst grade. The results would be identical if
we normalized entry as occurring in rst grade.
Our identication strategy requires knowledge of exact kindergarten entry cuto¤ dates
for 1954 to 1958, the years in which the individuals in our sample were eligible to enroll in
kindergarten. We collected data on state laws regarding school entry ages using historical
state legal statutes and normalized the statutory age to refer to kindergarten entry. If the
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history of the statute indicated a change in the state law in any given year, we examined
the state session law to determine the exact form of the change. Children who entered
school in states that gave Local Education Authorities the power to set the entry age were
deleted from the sample. Table 4 lists the kindergarten entry age cuto¤ dates for 1958 for
the states used in our analysis. Only two states moved their cuto¤s between 1954 and 1958,
our sample period, Maryland from a September to a December cuto¤ in 1958 and South
Dakota from a September to a November cuto¤ in 1956.
For both samples, we use information on quarter of birth, age, state and cuto¤ date to
determine whether each sample member was born before or after the state cuto¤. We delete
observations for whom this cannot be determined. For example, we drop individuals born
in the third quarter in states with a September 1 cuto¤. Due to this data restriction, we
deleted 47,058 observations from the 1960 census and 183,869 observations from the 1980
census. We restrict the sample to blacks and whites including those of Hispanic origin.
For the 1980 sample, we only include individuals who had completed at least one year of
schooling. Our nal sample includes 96,676 observations in the 1960 census and 373,845
observations in the 1980 census. All regressions include dummies for quarter of birth, sex,
race and state and age in quarters and age squared.18
                                                              Table 4: School Entry Cutoff Dates in 1958
1-Sep 10-Sept/15-Sept 30-Sept/1-Oct 15-Oct/16-Oct 31-Oct/1-Nov 1-Dec 31-Dec/1-Jan 1-Feb
Colorado Iowa Alabama Idaho DC California Connecticut Pennsylvania
Delaware  Montana Arkansas Maine North Dakota Illinois Florida
Kansas New Hampshire Missouri Nebraska Oklahama Louisiana Kentucky
Michigan Ohio New Jersey South Dakota New York Maryland
Minnesota Wyoming North Carolina West Virginia Wisconsin Mississippi
Oregon Virginia Nevada
Texas New Mexico
Utah Rhode Island
Tennessee
Most of the identication in the data comes from (i) comparing the relative performance
of fourth quarter and other births in states with December 31 cuto¤s with those with
September 30 cuto¤s and from (ii) comparing the fourth quarter relative to the rst two
quarters in states with cuto¤s in the rst half of September. As shown in table 4, there
is considerable within region variation. Florida and Mississippi have late cuto¤s while
Alabama, Arkansas and Virginia have third quarter cuto¤s. Pennsylvania and two New
England states have late cuto¤s while New Jersey has a third quarter cuto¤ and Ohio has
an early cuto¤.
18We experimented with also including year of birth, but the results were unchaged.
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5 Results
5.1 First Stage
Table 5 presents the rst stage results from the 1960 census for di¤erent choices of instru-
ment. Column (1) reports results from the regression of entry age (in years) on one quarter
of birth dummy (QOB 1 versus all others). Column (2) uses three quarter of birth dummies
(QOB 4 is the omitted quarter). Column (3) shows rst stage results using legal entry age
as the instrument without quarter of birth controls and nally, column (4) reports estimates
from our basic model, controlling for three birth quarters and a binary instrument (delayed
by law).19 Controlling for legally mandated delayed enrollment in column (4), the school
entry age monotonically decreases with quarter of birth. Column (4) reveals that individ-
uals born in the rst quarter begin school when they are about one-half year older than
are those born in the fourth quarter and who are not constrained by state laws. On the
other hand, in column (2) the quarter of birth instrument shows a much smaller di¤erence
in entry age between the rst and the fourth quarter since it fails to control for the more
restrictive laws in some states. Note also that the e¤ect of delayed is only .37. While
some children born in the fourth quarter begin school when they are rst allowed to enroll,
others are held back an additional year until they are almost 6 years old, and some who are
not legally entitled to enroll before age ve are nevertheless able to do so.
Finally, we note that none of the instruments we consider shows signs of
being weak. The F-statistics (squared t-statistics) are approximately 160 for
born in rst quarter, 56 for legal entry age and 85 for delayed by law.
19Note that this specication is isomorphic to one in which legal age is used as the IV and quarter of birth
is included in the structural equation. This specication can be found in the literature as a robustness check
(Elder and Lubotsky, 2006). Angrist and Krueger (1992) also include specications with state dummies but,
since that paper pre-dated awareness of the weak instrument problem, used roughly 1400 interaction terms
of quarter of birth, state and year of birth as instruments.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) Born in 1953*
Born quarter 1 0.2447 0.2685 0.5585 0.5988
(0.0193) (0.0374) (0.0132) (0.0161)
Born quarter 2 0.1119 0.4024 0.4468
(0.0377) (0.0128) (0.0161)
Born quarter 3 -0.0834 0.1942 0.1985
(0.0392) (0.0118) (0.0161)
Delayed by Law 0.3664 0.4273
(0.0397) (0.0179)
Legal entry age 0.4141
(0.0551)
Observations 96676 96676 96676 96676 19949
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.18
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state/quarter of birth.
Controls: state fixed effects, age in quarters, age square, race (white/black) and sex.
Sample restricted to individuals for whom state of birth is identical to birthplace.
                      Dependent Variable: School Entrance Age
Table 5: First Stage Estimates: 1960 census (1949-1953 cohorts)
One concern with the entry age variable is that since we assume there is no grade
retention, we are overestimating entry age. This is especially problematic since past research
has shown that the probability of repeating a grade is related to school entry age. Although
we do not have information on grade retention in the census, we can minimize the error
in measuring the entry age variable by restricting the sample to the youngest cohort. The
fth column of table 5 restricts the sample to those born in 1953. If one assumes that
entry patterns were constant from 1949 to 1953, then the di¤erence between the baseline
estimates in column (4) and those obtained using only the 1953 data reect the e¤ect of
grade retention. In this case, estimates based on 1953 data would be preferred. Estimates
using the 1953 only rst-stage can be obtained by multiplying the coe¢ cient on delayed
in the baseline model by :3664=:4273 or :8575.
It is also worth noting that, using the 1953 data, the di¤erence in entry age between those
born in the second and third quarter is almost exactly .25, suggesting that monotonicity
would apply to a sample of individuals born in these quarters. This, in turn, would mean
that it is possible to compute a LATE based on these samples. However, it is not clear that
this LATE would be of any policy interest.
As a nal check on our estimates, we use data on school enrollment at ages 5, 6 and 7
on April 1, 1960 among those born in the fourth quarter. Since only a minority of students
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ever attended kindergarten, we examined the proportion of individuals at each age who were
enrolled in at least rst grade, separately for those in states which required fourth quarter
children to delay and those who did not. Thus, for example, 11.5% of fourth-quarter children
born in states that allowed them to enter before turning ve, were in at least rst grade
at age 5, and 78.6% were in at least rst grade at age 6. From this we infer that 67.1%
entered at age 5 and turned 6 during the course of the school year.20 Using this approach,
we conclude that restrictive entry laws raised the age when they rst attended rst grade
for 40% of individuals, consistent with our estimates in the last two columns.
Di¤erential kindergarten retention would cause this to be an underestimate, but our data
suggest quite the opposite. The fraction of fourth-quarter children attending kindergarten at
age 5 (on April 1) is insignicantly di¤erent from the fraction in the other three quarters in
both the states in which they were allowed to attend early and those in which they were not.
However, the fraction of fourth-quarter children attending kindergarten at age 6 is much
higher relative to those in other quarters only in states in which they were constrained to
delay. Thus, we conclude that di¤erential retention in grade has, at most, a very small
e¤ect on our estimates.
However, this analysis also suggests that one way parents responded to their child being
delayed in rst grade was to have them attend kindergarten early. We do not know the
motivation for this behavior. It may simply have been to avoid child-care costs or it may
have been that children who performed well in kindergarten could get around the law. It
is important to keep this in mind when interpreting our LATE estimates and our policy
experiment. For a large fraction of children whose entry into rst grade was delayed by the
law, the e¤ect was to have them spend two years in kindergarten, and these students were
likely to have been somewhat behind their peers academically. Thus we will be estimating
the LATE for a particular group of students and in many cases estimating the e¤ect of an
additional year of kindergarten.
5.2 Reduced-Form and TS2SLS Estimates
Table 6 reports reduced-form estimates from the 1980 census. In column (1), which gives the
reduced form when the instrument is born in rst quarter, the instrument is associated
with a large negative e¤ect on educational attainment. In column (2), the legal entry age
instrument shows a somewhat smaller and statistically insignicant adverse e¤ect. Finally,
the last column indicates that controlling for quarter of birth, there is almost no e¤ect of
delayed school entry on educational attainment.
20 It is, of course, possible that some children entered school for the rst time at age 5 and went directly
into second grade. We expect this to be a very small proportion.
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                                                                            Table 6: Reduced Form Estimates 1980 census (1949-1953 cohorts)
QOB Legal Age Delayed
                            Dependent Variable: Educational Attainment
Legal entry age/Delayed -0.029 -0.0029
(0.0211) (0.0265)
Born in quarter 1 -0.0444 -0.0689
(0.0081) (0.0222)
Born in quarter 2 -0.0459
(0.022)
Born in quarter 3 -0.0122
(0.0234)
Observations 373845 373845 373845
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note:
1. Robust standard errors clustered by state/quarter of birth
2. All estimates control for state fixed effects, age in quarters, age square,
 race (white/black) and gender
Table 7 combines estimates from the 1960 and 1980 censuses. Using rst stage coe¢ -
cients reported in table 5, we predict entry age for the 1980 census respondents. TS2SLS
estimates are generated by a regression of 1980 educational outcomes on the predicted en-
try age. Using the method described in the appendix, we correct the standard errors to
account for the fact that the predicted value of school entry age is used in the second stage.
In addition, the standard errors are adjusted for clustering (at the level of state*quarter of
birth) using a parametric Moulton (1986) correction factor.
18
QOB  Legal Age Delayed
                                            Dependent Variable: Educational Attainment
Predicted Entrance Age -0.1815 -0.0700 -0.0078
(0.0422) (0.0450) (0.0727)
Born in quarter 1 -0.0645
(0.0229)
Born in quarter 2 -0.0427
(0.0146)
Born in quarter 3 -0.0107
(0.0152)
Observations 373845 373845 373845
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note: Moulton-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Additional controls for state, age in quarters, age squared, race (white/black) and sex.
Table 7: Two Sample Instrumental Variable Estimates 1960-1980 census
When we use born in the rst quarter as our instrument, consistent with Angrist
and Krueger, we nd a large negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment.
When we use legal entry age (not controlling for quarter of birth), we nd a smaller but
still substantial adverse e¤ect that falls short of statistical signicance at conventional levels
and is therefore consistent with the zero e¤ect in Bedard and Dhuey. The two estimates
are signicantly di¤erent at the .01 level. Finally, when we use the consistent estimator
that meets the monotonicity requirement, our estimate is very close to zero.21 As discussed
earlier, this zero coe¢ cient should be considered in the historical context. Those a¤ected by
the law were probably less academically advanced, and perhaps as many as half beneted
from an extra year of kindergarten.
6 Di¤erent LATEs or Failure of Monotonicity?
There are a number of reasons that the three estimates in table 7 may di¤er. First, if quar-
ter of birth is correlated with unobserved individual characteristics, both of the two tradi-
tional estimators are inconsistent As discussed earlier, our approach requires the weaker
21We also study the e¤ect of delayed enrollment on high school dropout and college attendance and
have looked at the di¤erences in outcomes by sex, race and race and sex interacted, but do not nd any
statistically signicant e¤ect. There is a nontrivial and very marginal statistically signicant e¤ect of delay
on the dropout rate among blacks but no e¤ect on educational attainment. However, we have looked for
signicant e¤ects on several overlapping groups using multiple measures of educational attainment. Finding
a t-statistic of just under 1.96 in one specication for one group is not all that unlikely.
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assumption that the di¤erence in unobserved characteristics across quarters of birth is not
correlated with the state cuto¤, which based on di¤erences in maternal characteristics ap-
pears to be valid. We also require that the entry age law a¤ect only the entry age and
educational attainment of the formally constrained group, those born in the fourth quarter.
Second, even if all three estimators are consistent when treatment e¤ects are homogeneous
(the traditional, non-LATE interpretation of IV), if treatment e¤ects are heterogeneous,
these instruments may not provide consistent estimates of the LATE. Finally, one or more
of these estimators may be consistent, but the LATEs captured by the instruments may
di¤er.
Our focus in this part of the paper is to distinguish between these last two explanations.
We estimate a very simple model of the school entry age decision. We then use the estimated
model to calculate the joint distribution of school entry age and educational attainment.
Using these data, we measure the e¤ect of entry age using each of the instruments. In
each case, the estimate using the simulated data is similar to the estimate using the actual
data. However, with the simulated data, we can calculate the true LATE that should be
associated with that particular IV estimator. In this way, we can determine whether the
departure from monotonicity is important.
6.1 Model
Our approach is very simple, consistent with the limited data available to estimate it. Every
child has an entry age, Ei , which maximizes her educational attainment:
Ei = a0 + a1 eEi:
We assume that the random component, eEi is distributed Beta(; ) with the two shape
parameters  and . The parameters a0 and a1 determine the bounds of the attainment-
maximizing entry-age distribution, a0 gives the lower bound while a0 + a1 sets the upper
bound. Though we allow a0 to depend on the state entry age law, we restrict the analysis
to two types of states since we have data only on quarter of birth (as opposed to month
of birth). The unconstrained states (u) refers to states with a either a January 1st cuto¤
or a December 31st cuto¤ so that all children, including those born in the fourth quarter
are permitted by the law to enter kindergarten in the year that they turn ve. The second
type of state, the fourth quarter constrained state (or "constrained state", for short) (c); is
restricted to states with September 30th or October 1st cuto¤.
Next, we introduce a shift parameter for being in a constrained state:
aco = a
u
o + 
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This implies that raising the minimum entry age for fourth quarter children may a¤ect
the attainment-maximizing entry age for everyone else. By allowing this age to be a¤ected
by school entry age laws, we are allowing for spillover e¤ect of laws. Existence of such
externalities would be a violation of the exclusion restriction required for identication
using instrumental variables, including our own, based on entry age laws.
Let Ei be the actual age at which a child begins school which di¤ers across children
because of di¤erences in quarter of birth and school cuto¤. We assume that students su¤er
an education penalty if they enter at an age other than their attainment-maximizing entry
age, Ei . For example, a student who is born on March 1 and whose attainment-maximizing
entry age would be age 5 (if school started on March 1), is now forced to enter at age 5.5
because school begins on September 1. She su¤ers a loss associated with being six months
away from her attainment-maximizing entry age. We assume that the education loss is
linear in the absolute departure from the attainment-maximizing entry age. Thus, ultimate
educational attainment is given by:
Si = S

i +   jEi   Ei j
Si , which is unobserved, is the educational attainment the individual would have at-
tained if she had entered at exactly her attainment-maximizing age. We assume that Si is
independent of quarter of birth and state cuto¤ date. This assumption rules out season of
birth e¤ects.
6.2 Indirect Inference
We use indirect inference to estimate the six parameters of the model (a0; a1; ; ; ; and
) so that the moments from the simulation match the moments from the data. We ap-
proximate the beta distribution by choosing 10,000 equally spaced points on the
cumulative distribution function.
For simplicity, we assume that children born in quarter 1 are born on 2/15, quarter 2
on 5/15, quarter 3 on 8/15, and quarter 4 on 11/15. Further we assume that the rst day
of school each year is August 15th in every state. This implies that Quarter 1 students can
enter school at age 4.5, 5.5, 6.5 or 7.5. Similarly, those born in quarter 2 can enter at 4.25,
5.25, 6.25 or 7.25 and so on for the third and the fourth quarter.
We assume that individuals with the lowest attainment-maximizing age are the ones,
among those born in a given quarter, who enter when youngest. In other words, if we
observe in the data that 10% of rst quarter children enter at age 4.5, we infer that these
are the 10% of the rst quarter children with the lowest attainment-maximizing age. If we
think that parents act optimally, this is equivalent to saying that any benets (or costs, if
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negative) other than the e¤ect on attainment are non-decreasing in attainment-maximizing
entry age.22
Based on these assumptions, we use the distribution of entry age (1949-1953 cohorts)
from the 1960 census to generate simulated data. Thus, we allocate individuals to their
entry age in the simulated data consistent with their quarter of birth and whether they live
in a 4th quarter constrained state or not.
Next, we regress educational attainment from the 1980 census on three quarter of birth
dummies, age in quarters and its square and state dummies, separately for the two types
of states to get the vector of coe¢ cients bdata (i.e. a total of six moments, coe¢ cients on
three quarter of birth dummies in each type of state). These coe¢ cients are the di¤erence in
average education between those born in each of the rst three quarters and those born in
the fourth quarter in each type of state. Identication in this model depends only on within
state-type education di¤erences since we are not using the di¤erence in average educational
attainment between the two types of states.
The objective of our indirect inference simulations is to choose parameters of attainment-
maximizing entry age distribution (; ; a0; a1 plus the shift parameter for constrained
states, ) and of the education loss function () to minimize the following loss function:
(bdata   bsim)0b 1(bdata   bsim)
We characterize the loss function as the sum of the squared deviations between the
regression coe¢ cients from the simulated data and the actual regression coe¢ cients weighted
by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates, b.
6.3 Simulation Results
We begin by estimating the model without , the shift parameter for being in a constrained
state. Table 8 shows results from regressions of educational attainment on three quarter
of birth dummies using the actual and simulated data. It shows the average di¤erence in
educational attainment between the fourth quarter and the three other quarters. The model
ts quite well and parameter is o¤ by more than about one half of a standard error.
The loss function is 0:73 which is distributed as a 2 with one degree of freedom. There-
fore any parameter that we add to the model will not be statistically signicant since the
best it can do is to reduce the loss function to 0:23 In particular, when we add the shift
22 It allows these costs to di¤er by quarter of birth and by state law so that the cost of delaying from age
4.5 to 5.5 may di¤er from the cost of delaying from 4.25 to 5.25 at the same point in the cdf.
23Although the literature on indirect inference assumes that if the number of model parameters equals the
number of empirical parameters, the t must be perfect, it is easy to show that this need not be the case
even when the underlying model is correctly specied.
22
Estimated Simulated Estimated Simulated
Quarter 1 -0.076 -0.079 -0.093 -0.095
(0.013) (0.010)
Quarter 2 -0.019 -0.017 -0.046 -0.040
(0.016) (0.014)
Quarter 3 0.023 0.018 -0.004 -0.004
(0.012) (0.007)
Note: Robust SE clustered by state/quarter of birth. Controls include state
dummies, age in quarters and its square.
N=292771
Table 8: Educational Attainment and Quarter of Birth by State Type
Unconstrained States Constrained States
parameter () to the model, it has a point estimate of 0:003 and improves the loss function
only trivially. Therefore in the remainder of this section, we use the model in which  is
constrained to equal 0:
The model parameters appear to us to be quite plausible. The lowest attainment-
maximizing age is 4:50 while the maximum is 7:34. The parameters of the beta-distribution
imply that optimal entry age is skewed, the mean is 5:23 but the median is only 5:08.
Most children would benet from entering when relatively young, but some would be better
o¤ being signicantly older than the norm. Children lose about eight-tenths of a year of
educational attainment if they enter a full year away from their attainment-maximizing age.
But such large di¤erences are rare, occurring only among a small percentage of those who
would be best o¤ entering when substantially older than the norm.
6.4 Reconsidering the Instruments
We now ask whether the failure of monotonicity produces estimates that are notably dif-
ferent from the LATE the (rst) quarter of birth and legal entry age IV estimators are
intended to measure.
Table 9 shows the results of applying each of the IV estimators to the data generated by
our model. The rst column reproduces the results from table 7. The corresponding rows
in the second column show the estimates applied to our data. Although our parameters
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                                                         Table 9: Effects of Entry Age on Education
From Data From Model
IV - Quarter 1 -0.18 -0.24
(0.04)
True LATE - Quarter 1 -0.24
IV - Legal Age -0.07 -0.09
(0.05)
True LATE - Legal Age -0.20
True LATE - Delayed -0.01 0.06
(0.07)
were not chosen to match the three IV estimates, the model ts the broad pattern found in
the data. The born in rst quarterinstrument shows the most adverse e¤ect of delaying
entry while the delayed by law instrument nds the least adverse and possibly positive
e¤ect. In each case, the estimate derived from the model lies within the condence interval
of the actual estimate.
Next we ask, what LATE should each estimator capture? In the absence of monotonicity
the concept is not well-dened, but a reasonable interpretation is that it should be a weighted
average of the treatment e¤ects where all the weights are positive. For the quarter-of-
birth instrument, it is straightforward to implement this denition. We can calculate the
treatment e¤ect for each individual born in the rst quarter of being born in the second,
third and fourth quarters. We then weight each of these changes by the absolute value of
the change in entry age.24 The true LATE dened in this way is given in the second row
of the last column of table 9. The IV estimate and the true LATE are virtually
identical.
For the legal entry age IV, we calculate the (numeric) derivative of educational attain-
ment with respect to an increase in entry age for all individuals in our sample and take the
average. The result of this exercise is shown in the fourth row of table 9. It is evident that
if this is the LATE that legal ageis intended to capture, then it badly fails to do so. The
estimated LATE is quite far from the true LATE.
By construction, using our approach, we get a consistent LATE estimate of the e¤ect
of the policy change of moving from a December 31 to an earlier cuto¤ on the educational
24Of course, we cannot calculate a treatment e¤ect for those who do not change their entry age, but such
individuals get zero weight in the calculation in any event.
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Weak Enforcement Strong Enforcement
Change in Educational Attainment 0.022 -0.278
(0.012) (0.019)
Percent Increasing Educational Attainment* 53.38 20.63
(4.75) (9.35)
*Results are only for those changing their educational levels
Standard errors in parentheses calculated using the delta method and numerical derivatives
Table 10: Effect of Raising Entry Age by Type of Law Enforcement: QOB 4 Only
attainment of children born in the fourth quarter (i.e. those children whose behavior is
a¤ected by the law). However, it is important to recognize that our estimates assume that
there are no externalities from this change. Conditional on this caveat, those children whose
entry is delayed, on average, are not harmed and may benet slightly from the delay.
7 Policy Experiments
An important policy question that arises from our analysis is whether our results would hold
in the current school system where school entry laws are relatively strictly enforced. The
weakly enforced cuto¤ dates in the 1950s may not be applicable to the debates involving
school entry age today. Schools today are under great pressure to adhere to strict standards.
As discussed in the introduction, a variety of factors have pushed states and districts to
increase entry age requirements and enforce them more strictly, but it is very uncertain as
to whether such policies are benecial.
To study the e¤ect of delaying school entry on attainment in recent years, we use the
simulated data to perform some policy experiments. First, we look at the e¤ect of moving
from a January 1 cuto¤ to an October 1 cuto¤ around the 1950s, a period when such cuto¤s
were very loosely enforced. Second, we consider what would have happened had there been
a strict October 1 cuto¤.
Table 10 reports the results from these two experiments. In the rst column, we explore
the e¤ect of the policy with weak enforcement. Consistent with the LATE estimates, the
e¤ect on average educational attainment is small but positive, and the majority of those
whose entry age is changed by the law increase their attainment. The second column shows
the results from the policy experiment with strict enforcement. We nd that moving from
a January 1 cuto¤ to an October 1 cuto¤ lowers average educational attainment of those
born in the fourth quarter by about one-fourth year, and the great majority of those who
are compelled to change their behavior are hurt by it.
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When laws were weakly enforced, the constrained children (those born in the fourth
quarter) had the option to enter school earlier than o¢ cially permissible. We see ample
evidence of this happening in our data. In this environment, overall, children beneted,
in terms of higher educational attainment, by moving to an October 1st cuto¤. However,
the policy experiment suggests that, in an environment where laws are strictly enforced,
constraining fourth quarter children to enter late hurts these children and reduces average
educational attainment.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that previous studies that have used IV to deal with the endogeneity
of school entry age have focused on a LATE of no real policy or practical interest. Moreover,
these studies have failed to provide consistent estimates of the LATE because of the failure
of the monotonicity assumption. As a practical matter, this turns out to be a serious
problem for the legal ageinstrument but not for the rst-quarter birthinstrument.
The born in rst quarter instrument, consistent with Angrist and Krueger, gives a large
negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment. When we use legal entry
age, we nd a smaller adverse e¤ect but one that falls short of statistical signicance at
conventional levels. We propose an instrument that satises the monotonicity assumption
and gives a consistent estimates of the policy-relevant LATE: the e¤ect of requiring a child
to enter school in the year she turns six when she would otherwise have entered a year earlier.
The results are consistent with no important policy e¤ect as the policy was practiced in the
1950s.
However, over the last fty years, school entry age laws have become noticeably stricter
both in requiring children to be older before entering school and through stricter enforcement
of the laws limiting entry although they generally continue to permit redshirting. We
nd that stricter enforcement of the laws in the 1950s would have had adverse e¤ects on
educational attainment. While we do not know whether the results continue to apply today,
they do provide evidence of considerable variation in optimal entry age and therefore suggest
that having a waiver policy that gives constrained children the choice to enter earlier than
the legally established age could increase educational attainment.
Some of the concerns raised in this paper are well known. In particular, a number of the
papers we cite question existing instrumental variables estimates on the grounds that birth
date is likely to be correlated with unmeasured characteristics. Partially in response to these
concerns, it has become increasingly popular to rely on a regression discontinuity design
(see for example, Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2011). This seems to us very defensible in
the Norwegian context where almost all children enter school exactly when rst permitted
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by law. However, it remains problematic in the U.S. context.
A typical regression discontinuity band is one month before and after the cuto¤ date.
Therefore, the regression discontinuity looks at the combined e¤ects of being a month
younger on those most committed to entering young and those most committed to entering
when old and being eleven months older on those in the middle. In the U.S., where there
is considerable redshirting and many children get around the law, the rst two groups
can be quite large. Consequently monotonicity is violated, and it is unclear exactly what
the regression discontinuity is estimating. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that it
provides a consistent estimate of the parameter of policy interest, the e¤ect on children
whose entry age is raised by the entry age regulation. Thus many of the concerns raised in
this paper apply to regression discontinuity.
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Appendix: Standard Error Derivation
Let the rst stage be
Yic = XicB1 + cDic + c + "ic (A1)
where observations are indexed by i and grouped in clusters indexed by c. D is the excluded
instrument. Within each cluster c, the (Yi; Xi)0s are correlated, but (Yi; Xi) from di¤erent
clusters are independent. Let c be the random component specic to cluster c and "ic is
the individual specic error term.
For convenience we can write the rst stage as
Yic = Zic  + c + "ic
Let the structural equation be
yic = XicB2 + Yic + c + ic (A2)
= XicB2 + (Zic  + c + "ic) + c + ic
= XicB2 + Zic  + c + ic
= XicB2 + Zicb  + c + ic + (Zic(   b )
Let X = [X Zb ] and B = [B2 ]:
Then
V ( bB) = E(X0X) 1X0$$0X(X0X) 1
where $ is the error term dened above i.e.
$ = c + ic +
h
Zic(   b )i
Each of the error terms is orthogonal to Z. Therefore the TS2SLS covariance matrix in the
presence of clustering is given by:
V ( bBTS2SLS;Moulton) = (X0X) 1X0
X(X0X) 1+2(XX) 1X0ZV (b )Z 0X(X0X) 1
(A3)
where 
 is a block diagonal matrix with diagonal elements !c (the intra-cluster correlation
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matrix for each cluster c)
! =
26666664
2 + 
2
 
2
 : : 
2

2 
2
 + 
2

: :
: :
2 
2
 + 
2

37777775 (A4)
and
V (b ) = (Z 0Z) 1Z 0
2Z(Z 0Z) 1: (A5)
It is easy to show that this formula reduces to the asymptotic covariance matrix formula
for TS2SLS estimator derived by Inoue and Solon (2010). However, we also correct for the
possibility of Moulton clustering in each stage.
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